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EQUITABLE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE
ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970-
UNITED STATES V. CAPPETTO
INTRODUCTION
During the 1950's and 1960's organized crime' accumulated vast sums
of money by means of syndicated gambling activities.2 In order to en-
hance its power and wealth, organized crime began to divert these cash
accumulations to various legitimate business enterprises.3 These new
1. The term "organized crime" refers to individuals who supply illicit goods and ser-
vices (e.g., drugs, gambling, loan sharking and prostitution) in order to gain control of
various business enterprises. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 1 (1967). [hereinafter
cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. See also SEN. SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED
CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 3d INTERIM REP., S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
150 (1951) [hereinafter cited as SENATE SPECIAL COMM. REPORT]; 83 YALE L.J. 1491 n. 1
(1974).
2. H.R. Doc. No. 105, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE Doc.].
There is considerable documentation indicating that gambling constitutes the main
source of income of organized crime. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice reported that revenue derived from illicit gambling
activities is estimated between seven and fifty billion dollars annually. TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. See also Johnson, Organized Crime: Challenge to the American
Legal System 1, 53 J. CRIM. L.C.& P.S. 399, 402 n. 22 (1962).
3. The adverse consequences of organized criminal activity on legitimate businesses will
affect the free market system in the same manner that price fixing, restraint of trade and
market boycotts have done in the past. These practices resulted in enactment of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1970), Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§12-27 (1970), Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §13c (1970) and the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act,
15 U.S.C. §§13,13a,13b,21a (1970).
See SENATE SPECIAL COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 170-71. Some of the legitimate
business enterprises which organized crime has infiltrated include advertising, communi-
cations, florist shops, automobile agencies, football, insurance, real estate agencies, ship-
ping and banking. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL
ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77 n. 2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT].
A report of the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association noted:
Organized crime. . . is a major threat to the proper functioning of the Ameri-
can economic system, which is grounded in freedom of decision. When organized
crime moves into a business, it customarily brings all the techniques of violence
and intimidation which it used in its illegal businesses. The effect of competitive
or monopoly power attained this way is even more unwholesome than other
monopolies because its position does not rest in economic superiority.
Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 2122 and S.
2292 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 556 (1969). The primary methods by which organized
crime are able to gain financial control of business enterprises involve extortion, invest-
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investments were made for a variety of purposes, including, the antici-
pation of favorable consideration from public officials;4 the acquisition
of capable managerial personnel to oversee the interests of organized
crime investments; and the retention of the services of a select group of
attorneys and accountants.5 Because the Government was ill-equipped
to deal with the mounting influence of criminal activities' and the shift
of organized crime operations into the legitimate business sector, Con-
gress was moved to enact the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.1
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA-70) provides a
broad jurisdictional base enabling the Attorney General to investigate
and prosecute persons engaged in racketeering activities. Title VIII of
the Act authorizes the Government to institute actions upon the show-
ing of the existence of racketeering activity,' while Title IX enables the
Justice Department to initiate a variety of actions in order to counteract
organized crime's control of business enterprises.' Additionally, the Act
empowers the Attorney General to ascertain the financial backing of
ment of gambling proceeds, loan sharking, bankruptcy and securities fraud, and the
acceptance of business interests as payment for gambling debts. SENATE REPORT, supra,
at 77; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 190.
4. Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 27 at 105 (1970) (Statement of Senator
John L. McClellan).
5. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4 n.49.
6. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, §1, 84 Stat. 922 (Statement of Findings
and Purposes); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 78.
7. 84 Stat. 922. [hereinafter cited as OCCA-70]. There are seven criminal procedural
provisions included in the Act: Title 1 of OCCA-70, 18 U.S.C. §§3331-34 (1970) (special
federal grand juries); Title II, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1970) (immunity); Title II, 28 U.S.C.
§1826 (1970) (sanctions for refusal to testify under grant of immunity); Title IV, 18 U.S.C.
§1623 (1970) (perjury); Title V, 84 Stat. 933 (security measures for witnesses); Title VI,
18 U.S.C. §3503 (1970) (depositions); Title VII, 18 U.S.C. §3504 (1970) (limits the retroac-
tivity of Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969)). Of the remaining six sections,
three concern substantive provisions: Title X, 18 U.S.C. § §3575-78 (1970) (increases sent-
ences for dangerous special offenders); Title XI, 18 U.S.C. §§841-48 (1970) (regulation of
explosives); Title XII, 84 Stat. 960 (establishment of a National Commission on Individual
Rights).
8. 18 U.S.C. §§1511, 1955 (1970).
9. Id. § § 1961-68. To enforce the provisions of section 1962, sections 1963, 1964 and 1968
were enacted. Section 1963 provides criminal penalties for violation of section 1962. Sec-
tion 1964 gives the Attorney General authority to commence civil proceedings to restrain
violations of section 1962. Also, the United States district courts have jurisdiction to order
divestiture, reorganization and/or dissolution of any gambling operation and/or to impose
reasonable restrictions on future gambling activities or investments. See note 12 infra.
Section 1968 provides for civil investigative demand which authorizes the Attorney Gen-
eral to order production of any documentary materials to assist in the investigation of
racketeering activities even before court action is initiated.
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legitimate businesses suspected of being infiltrated by organized crime
figures.'" Significantly, the Act authorizes both criminal" and civil, 2
including equitable, remedies in the combat against organized crime. It
is the exercise of the civil authority which provides the Government with
the far-reaching powers to attempt the successful eradication of organ-
ized criminal activities. Also this civil avenue of equitable prosecution
provides for the more interesting and controversial legal problems inher-
ent in OCCA-70.
THE JURISDICTION OF A COURT OF EQUITY IN ENJOINING CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
It has long been a fundamental maxim that a court of equity should
not use its powers to enforce a criminal statute or enjoin the commission
of a criminal offense." This maxim was considered to be implied in the
more general rule that equity should not intervene where adequate rem-
edies at law exist. The ability of the law courts to punish those who
10. 18 U.S.C. §1962 (1970).
11. Id. § 1963. For example, any party engaged in racketeering activities shall be fined,
upon conviction, not more than $25,000, imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both,
and forfeit any interest the party has acquired or maintained in violation of Title IX.
12. Id. §1964. Under section 1964(a) of the Act, the Attorney General may petition a
district court seeking an order to enjoin an individual or group from investing or even
participating in racketeering activities and the Attorney General may request divestiture,
reorganization or dissolution of the business involved in the racketeering operations.
Under section 1964(b) the district court is authorized to enter temporary restraining orders
or prohibitions pending final determination of the case. Also, section 1964(c) gives any
owner of any business who may have been adversely affected as a result of violations of
section 1962 the right to initiate suit for treble damages against persons engaged in
racketeering activity.
The civil provisions of the Act will be an effective impetus in effectuating the policies
of the Act for two reasons: the prevention of monopolistic and illegal activities by
organized crime infiltration into legitimate business, and the allowance of private parties
to initiate suit against organized crime figures. See Note, Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970: Title IX-Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 4 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM, 546, 625 n. 19 (1971).
13. 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 1347 (5th ed. Symons, 1941); 1 J. STORY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §3 n.1 (14th ed., 1918); Caldwell, Injunctions Against Crime, 26
ILL. L. REV. 259 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Caldwell]. Originally, the Court of Chancery
had jurisdiction for administration of both the criminal and civil laws. Mack, The Revival
of Criminal Equity, 16 HmAv. L. REV. 389, 390-91 (1903). In England, criminal equity
courts were extremely unpopular because of the lack of trial by jury. By the end of the
fifteenth century courts of equity were no longer involved in the administration of the
criminal laws. See Maloney, Injunctive Law Enforcement: Leaven or Secret Weapon, 1
MERCER L. REV. 1, 3 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Maloney]. See also In re Sawyer, 124
U.S. 200 (1888); Lord Montague v. Dudman, 28 Eng. Rep. 253, 254 (Ch. 1751) (dictum).
14. In Attorney-General v. Brown, 24 N.J.Eq. 89 (Ch. 1873) the court noted:
[Tihe jurisdiction of equity to redress the grievance of the public nuisance by
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would violate the criminal law has generally been recognized as ade-
quate protection of the community interest. 15 Nevertheless, if it can be
shown that the legal remedy is inadequate, the court of equity may
exercise its power and frame the required injunctive or declaratory re-
lief.'1 The inadequacy of the criminal remedy is established by showing
any of the following: (1) that irreparable harm will be suffered before
criminal proceedings can be initiated; (2) that the criminal activity
cannot be effectively suppressed through criminal procedures;'" or (3)
the criminal activity will continue in spite of the success of a criminal
prosecution. 8 Thus, the equity court will generally not intervene until
there has been some attempt to make use of the criminal processes;"
however, the mere ineffectiveness or failure of the criminal law is not a
sufficient basis for equitable intervention in a majority of jurisdictions. 20
Recently, the courts have been more inclined to make use of equity
jurisdiction to restrain criminal conduct."' This phenomenon has been
most noticeable in the realm of nuisance law wherein the courts are
likely to enjoin conduct which constitutes a public nuisance. 22 Injunc-
tions against public nuisances are often issued even without regard to
injunction is undoubted and clearly established; but it is well settled that, as a
general rule, equity will not interfere, where the object sought can be as well
attained in the ordinary tribunals.
Id. at 91-92. State v. O'Leary, 155 Ind. 526, 58 N.E. 703 (1900); State v. Diamond Mills
Paper Co., 63 N.J.Eq. 111, 51 A. 1019 (Ch. 1902). See Caldwell, supra note 13, at 271-72.
15. Note, Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REV. 994, 1016 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
16. See Caldwell, supra note 13, at 272 nn.67-68.
17. Oliff, Equitable Devices for Controlling Organized Vice, 48 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 623,
616 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Olifi].
18. See, e.g., Meyer v. Seifert, 216 Ark. 293, 225 S.W.2d 4 (1949); State v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc., 253 Minn. 236, 92 N.W.2d 103 (1958); Town of Linden v. Fischer, 154 Minn.
354, 191 N.W. 901 (1923). See also Corte v. State, 259 Ala. 536, 67 So.2d 782 (1953); State
v. Nelson, 189 Minn. 87, 248 N.W. 751 (1933); Bennett v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 14 N.E.2d
439 (1938).
19. See Oliff, supra note 17, at 626; State v. Crawford, 28 Kan. 726 (1882).
20. See Caldwell, supra note 13, at 273. See also Widmer v. Fretti, 95 Ohio App. 7, 116
N.E.2d 728 (1952); State v. Patterson, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 465, 37 S.W. 478 (1896). But see
Stead v. Fortner, 255 Ill. 468, 99 N.E. 680 (1912).
21. See Caldwell, supra note 13. Dunbar, Government by Injunction, 13 L. Q. REV. 347
(1897); Gregory, Government by Injunction, 11 HARV. L. REV. 487 (1898); Leflar, Equitable
Prevention of Public Wrongs, 14 TEXAS L. REv. 427 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Leflar];
Ralston, Government by Injunction, 5 CORNELL L. Q. 424 (1920); Note, Will Equity Enjoin
the Repeated Violation of a Penal Statute? 1953 Wis. L. REV. 163. For an excellent
discussion of the criticisms of equity's jurisdiction over criminal conduct see generally
Maloney, supra note 13, at 13-17.
22. Because of the numerous, albeit general definitions of public nuisance, the conduct
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the question of whether or not a specific crime has been committed 3 and
to be enjoined may involve almost any offense against the community at large. One
treatise describes nuisance as follows:
A public or common nuisance is an offense against the public order and economy
of the State, by unlawfully doing any act or by omitting to perform any duty
which the common good, public decency or morals, or the public right to life,
health, and the use of property requires, and which at the time annoys, injures,
endangers, renders insecure, interferes with, or obstructs the rights or property
of the whole community ....
J. & H. JOYCE, LAW OF NUISANCES §5(1906) [hereinafter cited as JOYCE].
Board of Health v. Vink, 184 Mich. 688, 151 N.W. 672 (1915); State ex rel Gibson v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 191 S.W. 1051 (Mo. K.C. App. 1917). See Baker, An Equitable
Remedy to Combat Gambling in Illinois, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 287, 298-300 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as Baker]. At common law, houses of prostitution and gambling were
considered to be public nuisances. It was necessary only to prove their existence in order
to have standing to request injunctive relief. See State v. Ellis, 201 Ala. 295, 78 So. 71
(1918); Respass v. Commonwealth, 131 Ky. 807, 115 S.W. 1131 (1909); King v. Dixon, 88
Eng. Rep. 753 (K.B. 1692).
Moreover, nuisance is classified as nuisance per se, or at law, and nuisance per accidens,
or in fact. A nuisance per se is
an act, occupation, or structure which is a nuisance at all times and under any
circumstances, regardless of location or surroundings, while a nuisance in fact
or per accidens is one which becomes a nuisance by reason of circumstances and
surroundings.
66 C.J.S. Nuisances §3 (1950). See Engle v. Scott, 57 Ariz. 383, 114 P.2d 236 (1941);
Asphalt Products Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga.App. 877, 16 S.E.2d 771 (1941); People v. City of
Chicago, 260 Ill. 150, 102 N.E. 1039 (1913); Greene v. Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. App.
Ct. 1931).
When the nuisance is not classified as per se the courts of equity have been less inclined
to issue an injunction if other, less restrictive, relief can be ordered. Morton v. Superior
Court, 124 Cal.App.2d 577, 582, 269 P.2d 81, 85 (1954), commented on the unusual remedy
of enjoining a nuisance per se:
An injunction against operating property for the only lawful purpose for which
it is fitted is an unusual. . . remedy. It should only be employed where no other
means of protecting the complaining public exists. Whether the attempt to
regulate be by ordinance or by injunction the approach must be reasonable.
The law is well settled to the effect that, when the defendant's business is not
a nuisance per se, the injunction should be limited in scope so as to not enjoin
the defendant's entire business if a less measure of restraint will afford the relief
to which the plaintiff is entitled.
Professor Caldwell states that the test for issuance of injunctive relief to restrain crimi-
nal conduct should not be that the conduct is a public nuisance but rather,
whether the defendant's activities interfere or threaten to interfere with some
interest of the state or of the public at large, to which an injunction will afford
more adequate protection than the law courts can give. If they do, it is a proper
case for equity . . . regardless of whether or not such activities . . . amount to
a public nuisance.
Caldwell, supra note 13, at 269.
23. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (injunction against strike); State ex rel. Moore
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without considering criminal prosecution. In these cases, however, it is
necessary to demonstrate the inadequacy of the possible legal reme-
dies. 4 Moreover, the claimant must establish that he has standing to
sue," that his interest is one that can be protected by a court of equity,"
v. Gillian, 141 Fla. 707, 193 So. 751 (1940)(usury); State ex rel. Smith v. Mahon, 128 Kan.
772, 280 P.906 (1929)(usury); Commonwealth v. Stratton Fin. Co., 310 Mass. 468, 38
N.E.2d 640 (1941) (usury); State ex rel. Burgum v. Hooker, 62 Neb. 639, 87 N.W.2d 337
(1957) (usury); State ex rel. Lyon v. Columbia Water Power Co., 82 S.C. 181, 63 S.E. 884
(1909)(water pollution); Attorney General v. Birmingham, 70 Eng. Rep. 220 (1858)(water
pollution); Attorney General v. Richards, 145 Eng. Rep. 980 (1794)(water pollution);
Baker, supra note 22, at 298-99 (gambling). But see State ex rel. Boykin v. Ball Inv. Co.,
191 Ga. 382, 12 S.E.2d 574 (1940).
24. See notes 21 and 22 supra. Usually an injunction will not be granted, however,
except where it can be shown that no relief can be obtained through criminal prosecution
and that punishment of the crime will not abate the nuisance or cease to'do irreparable
harm to an individual. When attempting to enjoin criminal activities a problem arises
with respect to the degree to which the plaintiff must first attempt to seek adequate relief
through a court of law. See JOYCE, supra note 22, §§415, 416; 2 J. STORY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE §1251 (14th ed. 1918).
Where the claimant may suffer injury before initiation of criminal proceedings, or where
the conduct cannot be abated under the criminal law, a court of equity will order an
injunction. At common law a property owner may have the operation of a bawdy house
enjoined even without any attempt to utilize the criminal laws. See Cranford v. Tyrrell,
128 N.Y. 341, 28 N.E. 514 (1891). Oliff, supra note 17, at 626 n.24.
25. The power of equity jurisdiction to restrain criminal activity which adversely affects
public interests is limited because of the usual requirement that a public prosecutor must
initiate the action. Oliff, supra note 17, at 627. However, state statutes which authorize
private citizens to initiate suits on behalf of the state have been upheld as constituting
matters for legislative determination. People v. Casa Co., 35 Cal.App. 194, 169 P. 454
(1917); People ex rel. Thrasher v. Smith, 275 Ill. 256, 114 N.E. 31 (1916). But see People
ex rel. L'Abbe v. District Court, 26 Colo. 386, 58 P. 604 (1899). In order for a private party
to initiate suit he must allege special damages. This usually refers to interference with
the personal or property rights of an individual. See, e.g., Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123,
110 A.2d 383 (1955). Oliff, supra note 17, at 627.
Judicial enforcement of injunctive remedies has been seen as part of the court's respon-
sibility to protect property. Originally, a court of equity would issue injunctive relief only
on the basis of interference with property rights; thus, some courts will not issue an
injunction on the basis of a public nuisance without the showing of a property interference.
People v. Lim, 18 Cal.2d 872, 118 P.2d 472 (1941); State v. Vaughan, 81 Ark. 117, 98 S.W.
685 (1906); Oliff, supra note 17, at 624-25. It was not long, however, before courts extended
their authority to enjoin conduct which affected the public health or morals even though
property rights were not involved. See Columbian Athletic Club v. State ex rel. McMahon,
143 Ind. 98, 40 N.E. 914 (1895); Board of Health v. Vink, 184 Mich. 688, 151 N.W. 672
(1915); State ex rel. Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 504, 179 A.
116 (Ch. 1935). The courts have also been inclined to issue injunctions against the illegal
practice of certain professions. See, e.g., Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass'n, 38
Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E. 577 (1931)(practice of law); Sloan v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506,
168 S.E. 800 (1933)(practice of medicine).
26. See Oliff, supra note 17, at 624-25.
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and that the acts complained of and the relief sought are within the
scope of' equitable jurisdiction."
The rationale for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction under these
circumstances is readily apparent. The prosecution of a defendant for
statutory crimes in the criminal courts does not afford adequate legal
or economic redress for third parties who may have been injured as a
result of the criminal conduct of the defendants. Normally, the only
recourse such third parties have is to proceed alone in separate civil
actions for their own specific injuries. 8 Thus equitable jurisdiction
assists when the conduct presents an injury which can be characterized
as offending the common good. Under such conditions an injured party,
or the state, need not wait until the wrongdoer completes the criminal
act, but may instead seek immediate enjoinder of the threatening con-
duct. 9 Here the court concerns itself not only with the common good or
with the enforcement of the criminal law as such, but it also seeks to
protect the rights of individuals from immediate and irreparable injury.
Injunctive relief may be granted even though the same defendants are
subject to criminal prosecution for the same or related conduct. 0
In the absence of specific statutory authority the courts are tradition-
ally reluctant to expand their use of equitable power to enjoin criminal
27. See Caldwell, supra note 13; Oliff, supra note 17, at 623 nn.5&6.
28. See, e.g., Jones v. Van Winkle Gin, 131 Ga. 336, 62 S.E. 236 (1908). See also JOYCE,
supra note 22, §§415, 416; Oliff, supra note 17, at 623 nn.5&6; note 24 supra.
29. Caldwell, supra note 13, at 259. See also Oliff, supra note 17, at 623:
Although the claimant may be entitled to damages in a court of law, there
are many situations where a money judgment will not completely vindicate his
rights or interests. Such situations arise where serious injury will occur before a
court of law can act or where the defendant's activities involve a continuous
course of conduct. With respect to the latter case, a legal remedy can compen-
sate only for past injury and can neither directly abate the defendant's conduct
nor compensate for future injuries. It has been held that equity may offer relief
in these situations despite the fact that the conduct complained of is also subject
to criminal sanctions. Thus, the fact that certain activities are crimes does not
preclude equitable relief.
30. The time honored equitable maxim that equity will not enjoin the commission of
criminal conduct stems from the adequacy of the criminal remedy at law. Staub v. Mayor
of Baxley, 211 Ga. 1, 83 S.E.2d 606 (1954); People ex rel. Barrett v. Fritz, 316 Ill.App.
217, 45 N.E.2d 48 (1942); Pitman v. State, 234 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). Over
the course of equity's history this maxim has become the exception rather than the rule.
See, e.g., State v. Mahon, 128 Kan. 772, 280 P. 906 (1929); People ex rel. Bennett v.
Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 14 N.E.2d 439 (1938). See generally 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1-42a (5th ed. 1941). For an excellent discussion of the role of equity in
enjoining criminal activity see Developments, supra note 15, at 1014-27. Equitable juris-
prudence enlarged as it became apparent that the law courts remained recalcitrant in
enlarging their own powers where a remedy at law was inadequate. Id.
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conduct which cannot ordinarily be characterized as nuisance.3' Given
Congressional or other legislative grant, however, the courts are not shy
in effectuating the intent of the lawmakers.32 By reason of specific legis-
lative enactment the public injury (nuisance), which might otherwise
appear to be lacking, is presumed to exist and appropriate equitable
relief is readily granted." Thus, from the historical perspective, the use
of equity to enjoin criminal conduct, while limited in scope, will not be
denied when such exercise of power is capable of being gleaned from
specific or implied legislative intent .3
31. Nevertheless, statutes have supplemented the equitable maxims and have undercut
the reluctance of the law courts. See generally Note, Statutory Extension of Injunctive
Law Enforcement, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1096 (1932). For the meaning of "nuisance" see note
22 supra.
32. See generally Note, note 31 supra. But see Hedden v. Hand, 90 N.J.Eq. 583, 107 A.
285 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919), wherein Justice Kalisch commented,
[Ilt is clear that the effect of making such [maintenance of a disorderly house]
a crime punishable . . . in the Court of Chancery is to deprive a defendant of
his constitutional right to have an indictment preferred against him by a grand
jury . . . and a trial by jury. It is idle to entertain the thought ... that the
Legislature can change the nature of an offense by changing the forum in which
it is to be tried.
Id. at 596, 107 A. at 291.
33. The courts theorize that because of the specific legislative enactment there already
has been a determination of the public injury and the appropriateness of the restraining
order. See Caldwell, supra note 13, at 276-78. Where a statute specifically sets forth
certain conduct as violative of the public interests an injunction will issue without proof
of irreparable injury or the showing of an inadequate remedy at law. State v. Diamond
Mills Paper Co., 63 N.J. Eq. 111, 115-16, 51 A. 1019, 1021 (Ch. 1902).
34. While developed in common law times, Knight v. Knight, 24 Eng. Rep. 1088-89 (Ch.
1734), equity jurisdiction finds expression in the Constitution and thus is exercised as an
inherent power of the federal courts. Article III reads in pertinent part: "The judicial
powers shall extend to all cases, in law and equity arising. . . under the laws of the United
States. ... U.S. Const. art. I1, §2 (emphasis added). Cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
321 (1944). In Bowles, Justice Douglas, in commenting upon the authority of the Adminis-
trator under §205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 to request injunctive
relief, noted:
Itihe essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do
equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexi-
bility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and pract-
icality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation
between the public interest and private needs as well as between competing
private claims.
Id. at 329-30. See also Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115, 130 (1962);
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943). The doctrine of federal equity
jurisdiction is pointed out in Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946) wherein
the Court noted:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the
19761
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Given this framework, and the specific provisions of OCCA-70, the
Government, in the exercise of its equitable authority under section
1964,'3 and pursuant to jurisdiction under section 1345 of Title 28 of the
United States Code,3" filed a complaint37 in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois requesting an injunction
District Court are available for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdic-
tion. And since the public interest is involved in a proceeding of this nature,
those equitable powers assume an even broader and more flexible character than
when only a private controversy is at stake . ... [Tihe court may go beyond
the matters immediately underlying its equitable jurisdiction . . . and give
whatever other relief may be necessary under the circumstances ....
Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be
denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless
a statute in so many words, or by necessary and inescapable inference, restricts
the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be
recognized and applied. 'The great principles of equity, securing complete jus-
tice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.'
Id. at 397-98. Although Porter makes reference to the equitable jurisdiction of article III
in relation to the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23, 33, one can argue by
inference its application to the OCCA-70. The Porter Court applied broad equitable pow-
ers under a statute granting to the federal courts injunctive jurisdiction "or other order,"
and applied the equitable doctrine not only because of the "other order" language but also
because of the "traditional equity powers of a court." Id. at 400. One could, therefore,
argue, as was persuasively done in Porter that,
Congress has utilized . . . the broad equitable jurisdiction that inheres in courts
and where the proposed exercise of that jurisdiction is consistent with the statu-
tory language and policy, the legislative background and the public interest.
Id. at 403. Under section 1964(a) the federal district court has authority to issue "appropri-
ate orders, including, but not limited to .... " This broad mandate of the Act, with its
emphasis on broad equity powers, is consistent with the Act's legislative history. For an
excellent analysis of Porter and other decisions regarding the constitutionally inherent
power of the federal courts see Comment, The Food and Drug Administration's Recall
Power after United States v. C.E.B. Products, Inc.: The Need to Amend the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 69 Nw. U.L. REv., 936, 950-57 (1975).
35. 18 U.S.C. §1964 (1970).
36. 28 U.S.C. §1345 (1970). The Government contended that even if Congress had not
enacted section 1964 there would, nevertheless, be jurisdiction under section 1345 which
provides:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the
United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue
by Act of Congress.
See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599-600 (1895); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 342-43 (1897).
37. United States v. Cappetto, Civil No. 74C-503 (N.D. Ill., filed Feb. 22, 1974).
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against certain defendants38 alleged to be participating in illegal racket-
eering activities in violation of sections 1955 and 1962 of Title 18 of the
United States Code. 9 The court entered a temporary restraining order4 °
prohibiting the defendants from continuing their gambling activities.,'
Notice of depositions was served on the defendants who chose to ignore
subsequent orders to appear and also failed to respond to requests for
admissions.2 The district court entered an order compelling the defen-
dants to respond to discovery and, upon their continued failure to do so,
entered a default judgment which found the material allegations of the
Government's complaint to be true 3 and adjudged the defendants to be
in contempt of court for failure to comply with the orders compelling
discovery." The appeal of the defendants to the United States Court of
38. The Government named as defendants Leonard Cappetto, the owner of the gam-
bling premises; Joseph Corabi, Thomas Wilson and Stanley Mikolajczak, all of whom
received and transmitted wagering information over the telephone; Joseph Mantia,
George Musteikas and Nicholas Pidone and other unknown defendants, all of whom
placed wagers with defendants Corabi, Mikolajczak and Wilson. Defendant Pidone per-
mitted his residence to be used for the illicit gambling activities. Complaint for Injunction
at 5-9, United States v. Cappetto 502 F.2d at 1354-55.
39. See notes 8 and 10 and accompanying text supra.
40. The temporary restraining order was requested ex parte by the government under
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 65(b) on the basis "that unless it were granted the
gambling would continue, and that the defendants are likely to avoid service of process
and this order if notified thereof in advance." Brief for Appellants at 6-8, United States
v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974). Rule 65 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides in pertinent part:
No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the adverse
party unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the
verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon.
FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
41. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1355 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S.
925 (1975).
42. The district court directed the defendants to respond to the Government's Requests
for Admissions, filed pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 36(a), no later than
five days after service thereof. Defendants filed objections to the Government's Requests
for Admissions which were denied by the district court. Brief for Appellees at 4-5, United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974).
43. The order was issued pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 37(b) directing,
by reason of the failure of the defendants to comply with court-ordered discovery, that
the material allegations of the Government's complaint were to be taken as true. 502 F.2d
at 1355. See note 44 infra.
44. Because the action was a civil proceeding the Government was entitled to civil
discovery proceedings and to request compliance with court-ordered discovery. FEDERAL
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 30, 37.
The defendants challenged the district court's contempt order which was entered after
the defendants refused to appear for court-ordered depositions and after defendant Corabi
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded with the opinion of the
court45 upholding the authority of Congress to grant the Attorney Gen-
eral and the courts the broad equitable relief provided for in section 1964
of OCCA-70.
United States v. Cappetto46 reaffirms certain basic guidelines and
principles to assist the Justice Department in seeking equitable decrees
for the protection of public interests.47 Moreover, the decision firmly
recognizes the use of the injunction as a constitutionally permissible and
alternative means by which the Government might expeditiously and
practically combat the forces of organized crime.
Cappetto can also be viewed as a brief primer on the exercise of
federal equitable jurisdiction as an adjunct to the criminal processes.
Indeed, the case responds to the usual objections to equitable enforce-
ment of criminal statutes by establishing the constitutionality of the
OCCA-70. Traditionally, the reluctance of courts to enjoin criminal con-
duct has resulted from the restriction of certain procedural and sub-
stantive rights which defendants would otherwise enjoy in a criminal
prosecution. 8 While illicit activity is the basis for injunctive or other
equitable relief, such relief is not sought for the violation of the criminal
statute per se. Cappetto notes that Congress may provide for both civil
refused to testify despite a grant of immunity under 18 U.S.C. §§6002, 6003 (1970).
Additionally, the district court ordered the named defendants to disclose the identifica-
tion of all unnamed individuals whose identities were known only by certain nicknames.
Brief for Appellees at 5, United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974).
The court of appeals in considering defendant Corabi's fifth amendment privilege in
refusing to testify despite the grant of immunity, stated that if use immunity is granted,
as it was to Corabi, it is coextensive with the grant against self-incrimination and may be
invoked only in criminal proceedings. Testimony illicited by an individual in a civil
proceeding under a grant of use immunity can be used against that party in the civil case,
but the testimony cannot be used against that party in a subsequent criminal case. 502
F.2d at 1359.
45. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 925
(1975) (before Tone, Stevens, Sprecher, JJ.; the unanimous opinion was written by Judge
Tone). Because the district court did not decide the issues raised by the Government's
requests for divestiture of the gambling premises and that the named defendants be
required to file with the Attorney General, for a 10 year period, quarterly reports concern-
ing their business activities, these questions were not before the seventh circuit. Id. at
1359.
46. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974).
47. The extent of Congress' authority to regulate and prohibit conduct which affects
the public interest coincides with the limits of the commerce clause. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§8, cl. 3; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); United States v. Cappetto, 502
F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1974). Injunctive regulation in this regard has been established
since In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
48. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 15, at 1016.
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and criminal remedies; Judge Tone, therefore, specifically recognized
that an injunctive proceeding does not rise to a criminal prosecution
merely because the acts complained of "also are punishable as crimes.""
In evaluating the civil/criminal dichotomy Cappetto rejects the rea-
soning offered by the defendants that analogous equitable authority in
federal antitrust" and pure food 5' legislation should not be followed
insofar as they serve purposes "totally different from the purely criminal
thrust of the Organized Crime Control Act." 5 Distinguishing the case
of Boyd v. United States," upon which the defendants relied for their
rationale, the court states that Cappetto is not a case "in which the
procedure 'though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and
effect a criminal one.' "54
It may have been argued that the equitable enforcement of criminal
laws unconstitutionally subjects a defendant to the possibility of double
jeopardy: he may be prosecuted in the criminal courts on the basis of
the same or related acts for which equitable relief has already been
decreed.55 Consequently, some courts have denied injunctive relief on
the basis of multiple prosecution consideration. Nevertheless, most
courts, including Cappetto by implication, have held that the double
jeopardy bar is inapplicable when the successive prosecutions are not
both criminal in character.
Another fundamental right of criminal procedure which is denied de-
fendants in equitable proceedings, including those under the OCCA-70,
is that of trial by jury. Under the Constitution this right is mandated
49. 502 F.2d at 1357.
50. Id. See 15 U.S.C. §§1 et seq. (1970).
51. 502 F.2d at 1357. See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§321-34
(1970).
52. 502 F.2d at 1357 (emphasis added).
53. 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (forfeiture proceedings pursuant to 18 Stat. 186 are criminal and
not civil even though brought in rem.)
54. Id. at 634; 502 F.2d at 1357.
55. See Developments, supra note 15, at 1018.
56. See, e.g., Schur, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 47 Cal.2d 11, 18-19, 300 P.2d 831,
836 (1956); People v. Lim, 18 Cal.2d 872, 880, 118 P.2d 472, 476 (1941)(dictum).
57. Double jeopardy results if there are multiple prosecutions for identical conduct and
the offenses are the same both in law and in fact. However, double jeopardy does not exist
where one is charged with multiple or different offenses even though these offenses may
arise from the same or similar acts. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 60 Wash.2d 21, 24, 371
P.2d 611, 612 (1962); State v. LaPorte, 58 Wash.2d 816, 818, 365 P.2d 24, 26 (1961); State
v. Harris, 2 Wash.App. 272, 283, 469 P.2d 937, 944 (1970). Prosecution for the material
allegations of the complaint and subsequent prosecution for contempt of court do not meet
the aforementioned test. If the same act is a violation of different provisions of the criminal
code, there may be separate prosecutions since the offenses are not the same.
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only in criminal trials" and in trials of civil actions known to common
law at the time of the enactment of the Constitution.59 Not only is the
defendant in an injunctive proceeding pursuant to the OCCA-70 subject
to civil liability without benefit of a jury, but, as Cappetto indicates,
there is the great possibility that those involved in organized crime will
be non-cooperative and thus subject to incarceration for contempt of
court.10 Thus the Government is able to score well without the proce-
dural necessity and delays of jury trial when it chooses to prosecute
civilly."1 Moreover the burden of proof which is required in a civil case
enables the Government to establish liability by a preponderance of the
evidence," rather than by proof beyond a reasonable doubt which ap-
plies to criminal cases. 3 Thus the conclusion of the court of appeals that
the injunctive procedures under the OCCA-70 require only the lesser
standard of proof will provide further impetus to the Government's
choice of remedies. 84
Finally, the civil remedies provided by the Act enable the granting
of relief even prior to the completion of the criminal acts which are to
58. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The jury trial provision of the sixth amendment was held
applicable to the states in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. VII:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversey shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.
Mr. Justice Story established the basic meaning of the seventh amendment when he
commented:
The phrase 'common law,' found in this clause, is used in contradistinction to
equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence. . . . By common law, [the
framers of the amendment] meant . . . not merely suits, which the common
law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal
rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those
where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were ad-
ministered . . . . In a just sense, the amendment then may well be construed
to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever
might be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights.
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830).
60. See Developments, supra note 15, at 996, 1086-90. Failure to comply with an injunc-
tive decree can result in either civil contempt or criminal contempt if there is a specific
intent to disobey the court order. See NLRB v. Whittier Mills Co., 123 F.2d 725, 727 (5th
Cir. 1941); Atlanta Printing Union v. Zell, 215 Ga. 732, 733, 113 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1960).
61. See Leflar, supra note 20, at 429. For an excellent discussion of the right to trial by
jury in contempt proceedings see Developments, supra note 15, at 1088-90. See also State
v. Howat, 109 Kan. 376, 198 P. 686 (1921).
62. See, e.g., Davis v. Auld, 96 Me. 559, 53 A. 118 (1902).
63. See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
64. See 502 F.2d at 1357.
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be enjoined. 5 The basis for the grant of equitable relief rests upon the
likelihood of future violations of the statute," and need not await the
actual commission of the crime. 7 Furthermore, the court's decree of
injunction may be granted ex parte upon the filing of a complaint by
the Government,68 unlike the case in a criminal proceeding where relief
must await the final determination of guilt."
Having disposed of the constitutional objections the court of appeals
justified its interpretation of the statute on the basis of the recorded
Congressional intent."9 The court recognized that Congress, cognizant of
racketeering activities, their adverse effects on American society, and
the inadequacy of criminal sanctions, enacted the OCCA-70 to be an
effective remedy" against organized crime and thus gave effect to the
statute as a primary weapon in the enforcement of this national policy.
CONCLUSION
Congress, by enactment of the OCCA-70, has attempted to further
extend the scope of injunctive relief. In upholding the constitutionality
of section 1964 the Cappetto decision purports to broaden the powers of
the federal government in curtailing organized crime's intrusion into
legitimate businesses through racketeering activities. Thus, while
Cappetto authorizes additional statutory remedies it does so with the
inherent benefit of common law principles and federal constitutional
authority.
Robert Allen Whitebloom
65. See Oliff, supra note 17, at 627-28.
66. See, e.g., United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953); Swift & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 530 (5th Cir.
1968); Bowles v. Lentin, 151 F.2d 615, 620 (7th Cir. 1945).
67. See Oliff, supra note 17, at 627.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 628.
70. See notes 2,3 and 6 supra.
71. The Cappetto defendants also argued that the Government had not established the
presence of irreparable harm nor the inadequacy of legal remedies; nevertheless, the court
concluded,
It was plainly the intention of Congress in adopting Section 1964 to provide for
injunctive relief against violations of Section 1962 without any requirement of
a showing of irreparable injury other than that injury to the public which Con-
gress found to be inherent in the conduct made unlawful by Section 1962. It is
also obvious that Congress did not intend to require a showing of inadequacy of
the remedy at law.
502 F.2d at 1358-59.
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